Research

Publications

Fit-Related Reasons to Inquire, accepted at Australasian Journal of Philosophy (penultimate draft, please cite final version!)

Abstract: Recent philosophical work on inquiry yields important results about when it is appropriate to inquire and to what extent norms on inquiry are compatible with other epistemic norms. However, philosophers have been remarkably silent on the matter of what questions we ought to take up in the first place. In this paper, I take up this question, and argue that moral considerations constitute fit-related, right-kind reasons to adopt interrogative attitudes towards, and so inquire about, particular questions. This is a conclusion of more general interest, because – as I explain – we might think that moral considerations are at best wrong-kind reasons for attitudes. If my contentions are right, then there is at least one kind of attitude – namely interrogative attitudes – of which this is not true. 

In Progress 

(Drafts available upon request) 

What Resistance Requires 

Practical Reasons for Belief and the Basing Relation 

Upcoming:

TBD⍭

Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Meeting, June 2024

Past: 

Practical Reasons for Belief and the Basing Relation* 

APA Eastern Division Meeting, January 2024

What Resistance Requires*

PPE Society 7th Annual Meeting, November 2023

North Carolina Philosophical Society, March 2023

What is a Standpoint?*

PPE Society 7th Annual Meeting, November 2023

Fit-Related Reasons to Inquire 

Wellesley College Proctor Workshop, September 2022

PPE Society 6th Annual Meeting, November 2022*

UNC Applied Epistemology Works-in-Progress Series, November 2022

Context Probabilism and the Modal Dilemma 

UNC Works-in-Progress Series, May 2021