RESEARCH OVERVIEW
My research ranges across epistemology, social, and feminist philosophy, and especially their intersections. I am particularly concerned with how our social location (i.e., where we are located within structures of race, gender, class, etc.) affects our epistemic position.
PUBLICATIONS
(Forthcoming). Fit-Related Reasons to Inquire. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
ADDITIONAL PAPERS (Drafts available upon request)
A paper on resistance to oppression (R&R as of 4/7/25)
This paper motivates and defends a novel version of the 'Non-Accidentality Requirement' on resistance (i.e., the idea that for an act to be an act of resistance, it must be no accident that the act violates an oppressive norm or disrupts an oppressive practice). In doing so, it argues that acts of resistance turn out to be pro tanto morally worthy acts.
Social Location and Higher-Order Evidence
This paper argues that facts about marginalized people's social location provide higher-order support for certain of their beliefs about the workings of marginalization.
The Epistemic and the Affective
This paper argues that achieving knowledge of facts about injustice constitutively involves cultivating particular emotional dispositions, namely, dispositions to feel the emotional responses that those injustices merit.
What Standpoints Must Be
This paper argues that if consciousness-raising is to be the means by which we achieve standpoints, then standpoints cannot amount to perspectives from which we have a greater awareness of how knowledge is produced and authorized. Rather, they must be perspectives from which one is better able to recognize oppression as such.
A User's Guide to Standpoints
This paper motivates and defends a novel account of a standpoint on which certain groups achieve standpoints by engaging in imaginative perspective sharing.
There Might be an Epistemic Advantage to Being Oppressed: Reframing Recent Debates in Standpoint Epistemology
This paper argues that certain recent debates in standpoint epistemology are philosophically trivial because they ultimately concern whether marginalized people are epistemically advantaged with respect to knowledge of facts about the workings of marginalization. It then shows how this debate is distinct from one that concerns whether marginalized people are epistemically advantaged by virtue of being well-suited to perform ideology critique, and suggests that we ought to turn our focus to the latter.
Practical Reasons for Belief and the Basing Relation
This paper argues that our answer to the question of whether practical reasons can constitute normative reasons for belief should not hinge on whether practical reasons can constitute motivating reasons for belief. Instead, we should take up the former directly.